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Plaintiffs/appellants (hereinafter "plaintiffs") reply to
the brief of defendant/respondent

(hereinafter "defendant") as

follows:
As discussed extensively in appellants7 prior brief,
under the Condemarin and Berry cases, the "rational basis" standard
of review is not sufficient in testing the constitutionality of
either the two-year statute of limitations (as applied to minors)
or the four-year statute of repose in the medical malpractice act
because both statutes infringe rights protected by the open courts
clause.

The appropriate "intermediate standard of review" places

the burden on defendant to show that:
1.

There was a medical malpractice

insurance

"crisis," and, if so, that it was caused by medical malpractice
claims (not by investment losses of insurance companies);
2.

Denying minors the protection of the tolling

statute actually helps in a substantial way to solve that crisis;
and
3.

It is reasonable to attempt to solve a medical

malpractice crisis by a measure so drastic as denying to some
minors a remedy for their injuries.
It is against this backdrop that respondent's brief and
the following reply should be considered.

1

I.

REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT REGARDING
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A.

The Perceived Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis of the 19707s and The Enactment of
Medical Malpractice Legislation.

On pages 8-12 and 15-16 of defendant's brief, he asserts
the following:
a. Minors7 rights are being adequately protected in
Utah even under the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
b.

Thirty malpractice claims are being filed in

Utah each month.

With approximately one-seventh of those being

claims by minors, it means that 51 malpractice claims are being
brought by minors each year.
c. Minors are receiving increasingly greater damage
recoveries in Utah for medical malpractice.
d. There was a medical malpractice insurance crisis
in Utah.
e.

That crisis is a "clear social and economic

evil" that needs to be eliminated.
f.
statute

Justification

of limitations

is found

for the medical

malpractice

in the

legislative

"express

findings regarding the mounting medical malpractice

insurance

crisis."
g.

If minors7 medical malpractice claims were

tolled during minority under the general tolling statute, it would
result in potential liability of health care providers for so long
a period that it would be difficult for insurance companies to
determine the extent of their exposure and to calculate premiums,
2

and

many

insurers would

therefore

withdraw

from

malpractice

liability insurance markets.
h. It is rational to conclude that taking away from
minors the protection of the tolling statute would be helpful in
"containing the malpractice

insurance crisis" by

"controlling

malpractice insurance costs and ensuring continued health care
services in this state."
Plaintiffs' responses to those claims are as follows:
1.

Defendant cites no authority or source for the

statement on page 8 of his brief that 30 malpractice claims are
being filed (by adults and minors) in Utah each month.
2.

The

1990

federal

census

showed

a

total

population in Utah of 1,722,850, with 1,095,406 of those persons
being age 18 or over, leaving 627,444 persons under age 18. Minors
in Utah therefore comprise 36.4% of the population, yet defendant
assumes on page 8 of his brief that only one-seventh (14.3%) of
medical malpractice claims in Utah are filed by minors.

Suits by

minors therefore represent a disproportionately small number of
medical malpractice suits filed.

(Plaintiffs request the court to

take judicial notice of the census figures referred to above.

A

copy of the pertinent pages of the 1990 census is included in the
Addendum.)
For defendant's
medical malpractice claims

assumption

that

one-seventh

of the

involve minors, he cites Jenkins,

California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act:

An Equal

Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 960-61 (1979).
3

What

Jenkins actually stated was that "statistics show that less than
one-seventh of all medical malpractice claims filed are brought by
or on behalf of individuals under the age of 20.."

Id. at 960

(emphasis added), citing U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare,
The Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice at
12 app. (1973) . Thus the ratio of suits involving minors (persons
under 18, not persons' under 2 0) would appear to be more on the
order of one-eighth (12.5%).

As to how many minors would have

brought claims after the period of the new medical malpractice
statute of limitations in California (which, like Utah's, took away
the protection of the tolling statute) but before expiration of the
traditional limitations period (where the statute was tolled during
minority), Jenkins said it is impossible to determine, but that
"extrapolation from the available statistics . . . arguable leads
to the conclusion that the number of minors' claims in this
category is small." Id. at 961. Accordingly, the statutory scheme
singling out children is not justifiable.

Not only are they the

most innocent and helpless of all classes of the society and,
therefore, the most deserving of the protection of the law, they
bring a relatively small number of claims. Therefore, defendant is
clearly unable to meet his burden to demonstrate that infringing on
the rights of children to bring their claims will solve the alleged
crisis or that it is a reasonable approach.

This is particularly

true in light of the allegation in the defendant's brief (page 8)
that

in

15 years

there

have

been

only

malpractice claims asserted by minors.
4

four

tardy

If this

medical

is true as

defendant has alleged, then there is no way that depriving four
children of their claims could possibly be said to be a reasonable
or effective way to solve the purported crisis.
3. At the top of page 9 of defendant's brief, he states
that "minors' medical malpractice claims are being both heard and
vindicated

in

Utah

courts

with

increasingly

greater

damage

recoveries being awarded", but defendant cites no authority for
that statement other than to refer to two large jury awards in 1984
and 1983 (seven and eight years ago, respectively) , and one of
those (Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P. 2d 832 (Utah
1984)), was not even a medical malpractice case.

It was an action

against a pharmaceutical company for negligence in failing to
adequately test a drug and to warn of its dangers.
4. On page 10 of the defendant's brief, he refers to the
"express legislative findings" regarding the medical malpractice
insurance crisis. Those supposed "findings" are set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-2 as ostensibly justifying the various measures
adopted by the legislature in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
(Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 through -16, sometimes called herein the
"medical malpractice act") to reduce access to the courts and
otherwise to restrict exposure of health care providers and their
insurance carriers for malpractice.

Similar medical malpractice

acts were enacted in many states in the mid-1970,s (Utah's was
enacted in 1976) as a result of lobbying efforts by politically
powerful insurance and medical groups, who threatened drastic
curtailments in the availability of health care if the legislatures
5

did

not

respond

to

their

demands.

(See

Note,

The

Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose:
Judicial Conscience vs. Legislative Will, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 397, 405
(1989) ; Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice - The Illusory Crisis, 54
Fla. Bar J., 114 (Feb. 1980). "Regardless of whether the underlying
circumstances were truly severe, the perceptions of a panicked
public as well as ferocious lobbying by the medical profession and
insurance industry generated intense pressure on state legislatures
to enact remedial [medical malpractice] legislation."
Restrictive

Medical

Malpractice

Compensation

Learner,

Schemes:

A

Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual
Liberties, 18 Harv. J. on Legis., 143, 144 (1981).
5. Some of the most common provisions included in these
medical malpractice acts in the various states, in order to reduce
medical malpractice exposure, were: (1) limiting either the amount
of

recovery

providers;

by

plaintiffs

(2) shortening

or

the

the

liability

statute

of

of

health

limitations

care

period

applicable to medical malpractice actions (including eliminating
the protection of the general tolling statute for minors); (3)
abrogating

the collateral

source rule in medical malpractice

actions; (4) establishing medico-legal screening panel plans; and
(5) establishing either compulsory or voluntary arbitration plans.
Learner, 18 Harv. J. on Legis., supra at 14 6.
6.

The preambles of those medical malpractice acts

typically refer, expressly or impliedly, to a medical malpractice
crisis because of increasing numbers of claims and increasing
6

amounts of settlements and judgments. The information used by the
insurance industry and medical profession in their lobbying efforts
and the legislative "findings" based on that information have come
under increasing attack in the years since those malpractice acts
were

enacted,

and

a

number

of

courts

have

made

their

own

independent evaluations of whether the legislative findings were
justified.

Note, 34 Vill. L. Rev., supra at 415; Cunningham &

Lane, 54 Fla. Bar J., 114 (Feb. 1980); see cases cited on pages 1621 of plaintiffs/appellants7 initial brief.
7. The so-called medical malpractice insurance crisis of
the 1970's was actually caused in major part by the insurance
companies having suffered heavy losses in their investments during
that period and then raising malpractice insurance premiums to
recoup those losses.

See, e.g., McKay, Rethinking the Tort

Liability System: A Report from the ABA Action Commission, 32 Vill.
L. Rev. 1219-1221 (1987); Learner, 18 Harv. J. on Legis., supra at
144; Aitken, Medical

Malpractice:

The

Alleged

"Crisis" in

Perspective, Medical Malpractice, Feb. 1976, p. 90.
An illustration is provided in one of the law review
articles cited in defendant's brief.

Argonaut Insurance Company

threatened to cancel all its New York physicians7 policies on July
1, 1975 after it was denied a rate increase of 196.8% in January
1975, after having been granted an earlier rate hike of 93.5% in
July 1974.

Even though the president of Argonaut claimed his

company lost $10 million in 1974 in medical malpractice costs, yet
Argonaut actually collected $15 million in premiums in 1974 and
7

paid out only $250,000 in claims, enabling it to pay a $10,200,000
dividend

to

its

parent

company,

the

conglomerate

Teledyne

Corporation,, In that same year Argonaut experienced a $90 million
decrease in the value of its bond and stock portfolio. The average
payout in 1974 for the industry as a whole was $750 per doctor,
whereas the average premium collected per doctor was $3,500. Note,
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act:

Legislative Surgery on

Patients Rights. 10 Val. U. L. Rev. 303-305, notes 7 and 10 (1976).
It

was

also

the

Argonaut

Insurance

Company

that

precipitated the crisis in California:
The present crisis was triggered in the fall
of 1974, when the Argonaut Insurance Company
announced
to
the
doctors
of
northern
California that they were seeking a 380 per
cent increase in premiums and ultimately
intended to withdraw entirely from the field
of
medical
malpractice
insurance.
Subsequently,
other
insurance
companies
announced proposed increases in premium rates
and echoed the claim of the unprofitability in
malpractice insurance. In the final analysis,
it was Argonaut's abrupt increases coupled
with the equally abrupt reaction by northern
California physicians that led to the 1975
impasse over malpractice coverage.
Almost
without questioning the validity of these rate
increases, the medical profession lashed out
at the legal profession, demanding radical
changes in the existing compensatory system
for medical malpractice.
Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective,
Medical Malpractice, Feb. 1976, 90-91.

That led to a doctors7

strike, which nearly bankrupted numerous hospitals in the state of
California and led to the hastily enacted medical malpractice act
in California.
8.

Jd. at 91.
Shortly

before

passage
8

in the

Utah

House

of

Representatives
malpractice

of

act

the

bill

(Utah

Code

that
Ann.

became
§§

the

78-14-1

Utah

medical

through -16),

Representative Matheson on the floor of the House made a motion to
strike from the bill all the language which now appears in the
first paragraph of § 78-14-2 after the first three words

("The

legislature finds") and to strike the first 26 words of paragraph
2 of § 78-14-2, ending with the word "system".

In other words, he

proposed to strike the legislative "findings" to the effect that
medical malpractice claims had increased and had caused premiums to
rise and had discouraged some health care providers from continuing
to provide services, etc.
Representative Matheson's reasons for moving to strike
those "findings" were that, based on the information furnished to
the legislature, including the report from the "interim study
committee," those medical malpractice conditions, while they might
then

be

occurring

on

a

national

level,

and

especially

in

California, were not occurring in Utah and that there had even been
a decrease in medical malpractice claims in Utah.
While Representative Matheson's motion to delete those
supposed legislative findings was defeated, no one disputed those
statements

which

he

made

on

the

floor

of

the

House.

(Representative Matheson's remarks are found on pages 10-13 of the
Transcription of Discussion and Vote on January 30, 1976 in Utah
House of Representatives on H.B. 35 - Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act, a copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto.)
9.

The "long tail of liability" (which supposedly made
9

it difficult for insurance companies to predict future liability
and therefore difficult to calculate premiums) actually does not
significantly

affect

premiums

because

88%

of

all

medical

malpractice injuries which result in claims are reported within the
first two years following injury, and 97% are reported within four
years; the "long tail" effect is therefore minimal and predictable.
Kenvon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 978 (Ariz. 1984), citing statistics
contained in U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Pub.
No. 73-88, Medical Malpractice:

Report of the Secretary's Comm'n

on Medical Malpractice. 254 (1973) ;

Hayes v. Mercy Hosp. and

Medical Center, 557 N.E.2d 873, 887-88 (111. 1990) (dissenting
opinion).
10. The amount by which medical malpractice legislation
has reduced

health care costs

is so insignificant

as to be

irrelevant.

Kenyon v. Hammer, supra at 977; Hayes v. Mercy Hosp.

and Medical Center, supra at 890.
11.

With respect to insurance companies which withdrew

from the medical malpractice insurance market, most of them were
"marginal firms not fully committed to this line of insurance" and
their withdrawal "reflected efficient market discipline.

The gap

left by their departure was filled by newly formed mutual insurance
companies owned and operated by medical groups.

These provider-

owned companies now hold a considerable share of the malpractice
market."

Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's:

A Retrospective, 49 Law and Contemporary Problems, No. 2, pp. 5, 89, 19 (Spring 1986).
10

12. Notwithstanding all of the medical malpractice acts
enacted in the 1970's, medical malpractice premiums have continued
to rise, but despite the continued increase in premium costs, the
ratio

of

such

substantially.
198 6)

costs

doctors7

incomes

has

not

changed

Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 725 (Ohio

(concurring

Association's

to

own

opinion),
surveys

citing

reported

Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's:

the

American

in Robinson,

Medical

The Medical

A Retrospective, 49 Law and

Contemp. Probs., 5, 31 (Spring 1986).

In addition, malpractice

insurance premiums are not a financial burden to the health care
consumer (the patient) because even with continued increases in
premiums, malpractice insurance costs have remained at about 1% of
total health care spending since 1976.

Mominee, supra at 725,

citing Bovbjerg, Koller & Zuckerman, Information on Malpractice:
A Review of Imperical Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 Law and
Contemp. Probs., 85, 93 (Spring 1986).
13.

There is a growing judicial sentiment that the

medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's was illusory and
that the legislation enacted in response to it was ill-conceived
and inappropriate. Note, 34 Vill. L. Rev., supra at 415; McKay, 32
Vill. L. Rev., supra at 1220. To the extent that there has been or
is a medical malpractice crisis, "the consensus of opinion among
physicians, other health care providers, lawyers, lawmakers, and
disinterested observers - to the extent that such a concensus
exists - is that the high incidence of actual medical malpractice
occurring throughout the country is the chief cause of the crisis."
11

Jenkins, California's Medical Iniurv Compensation Reform Act:

An

Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 851 (1979),
citing a number of authorities.
14.

On page 16 of defendant's brief he cites Redish,

Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Constitutional Implication. 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1977).

That

Redish article has been referred to (see Haves v. Mercy Hosp. and
Medical Center, 557 N.E.2d 873, 887-88 (111. 1990) (dissenting
opinion)) as one which took the position that there was a medical
malpractice crisis in the 1970's. But Redish prepared his article
for (and it was funded by) the American Hospital Association (see
footnote in Redish, supra at 759), and the year 1977, when that
article was published,'was during the period when the medical and
insurance industries were engaged in their lobbying efforts and
state legislatures were responding by enacting medical malpractice
tort reform acts.
article paid

In that environment it is hard to imagine an

for by the American Hospital Association being

anything but supportive of their drive for legislation to limit
medical malpractice actions.
On

page

8 of

defendant's

brief

he

cites Jenkins,

California's Medical Iniurv Compensation Reform Act, An Egual
Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829 (1979), which was
written four years after California hastily enacted its medical
malpractice reform act as emergency legislation prompted by the
"apparent crisis" in the medical malpractice insurance industry.
Jenkins, supra at 831-32.

As a prologue to his article, Jenkins
12

quotes the following:
Mindful of the adage: Act in haste; regret in
leisure, there is concern that this sudden
revolution of our tort system may have longrange effects which will change the lives of
all citizens - physicians included - without
any remedial effect on the curse which
provoked the revolt - exorbitant insurance
premiums.
Id, at 831.

Jenkins concludes that three provisions of the

California act, including the statute of limitations as applied to
minors, deny malpractice victims equal protection of the laws and
should be held to be unconstitutional.
Ironically, in the third law review article referred to
by defendant (cited on page 11 of his brief) , Note, The Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients7 Rights,
10 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 303 (1976) (examining the Indiana medical
malpractice act), the author also concludes that the provision
which denies minors the benefit of the tolling statute "must be
stricken as an arbitrarily drawn statute which denies minors equal
protection of laws."
B.

Id. at 350.

Plaintiffs7
Raised
in
Argument.

Response to Other Matters
Point I of
Defendants

On pages 7-8 of defendant's brief he states that because
both

Kevin

and

Patrick were not only minors but were also

permanently mentally disabled, (and would therefore always need to
rely on a guardian to pursue an action for their injuries),
"striking the statute of limitations would not provide them any
further remedy.

They would still have to rely upon a guardian to

bring an action on their behalf."
13

It is true that Kevin and

Patrick would always need to have a guardian to bring an action for
them, but it is obvious that the medical malpractice statute of
limitations has taken away a remedy they otherwise would have. If
the antitolling provisions of the statute were stricken, Kevin and
Patrick would have the benefit of the tolling statute and would be
able to proceed with their present action, whereas, with that
statute being in place (including the provision that denies minors
the protection of the tolling statute), defendant is claiming that
Kevin and Patrick have no right to pursue their action.

In

addition, the medical malpractice statute of limitations also
applies, by its terms, to minors who are not mentally disabled.
Those minors, upon reaching the age of majority, would not have to
continue to rely on a guardian but would be able to pursue a remedy
in their own behalf

(were it not for the medical malpractice

statute of limitations) for their injuries.
At the top of page 8 of defendant's brief, defendant
represents that plaintiffs have suggested that Kevin and Patrick
"were deprived [of their opportunity to bring an action] because no
one could act for them
suggested.

. . . ." That is not what plaintiffs have

Under the medical malpractice statute of limitations

Kevin and Patrick were deprived of their remedy because nobody did
act for them, within the time limited by the statute, (although
someone did act well within the time normally available to minors
in personal injury cases). The reasons why no one acted quickly to
pursue a remedy on behalf of Kevin and Patrick for their injuries
are apparent and understandable.
14

Their natural father could not

cope with the fact of their severe mental and physical disabilities
at their birth and became mentally incompetent himself, having to
be committed to a mental hospital, and their mother, Marian J.
Meehan, was thus left to bear the burden of caring for the two
severely disabled infants. (R. 131-33 - Affidavit of Mrs. Meehan.)
That that burden was a consuming one is illustrated by the video
tape submitted to the trial court as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit
of Mrs. Meehan, which video tape accurately depicts the mental and
physical condition of Patrick. (R. 131-33.)

(That video tape will

be transmitted to the Supreme Court as part of the record in this
case.)
Furthermore,.it was not until more than four years had
elapsed from the time of their birth that the mother became aware
that Kevin and Patrick's having been born prematurely could have
been avoided (as well as the injuries they received) if she had
received proper medical care. (R. 131-32.)
In addition, experience and common sense teach that most
people are naturally reluctant to sue somebody, especially their
doctor.

They try to cope with the problem.

For many parents of

children who are victims of medical malpractice, it is only when
financial burdens become intolerable as a result of the injury or
when the child is not able to be provided with the care he or she
needs because of lack of funds, that the parents are driven to
pursue the child's legal remedy in order to obtain financial help.
Denying children the protection of the tolling statute can often
thus penalize the child whose parent initially tries (and often
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succeeds) in bearing the burden of the financial impact of the
malpractice

without

resorting

to

litigation.

The

shortened

statutory period can also undermine the intent of the legislation
(curtailing medical malpractice cases) by influencing parents to
bring suits quickly instead of waiting to see how the child does
(and possibly never filing suit). See Jenkins, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev.,
supra at 961.

A recent study by Harvard Medical Practice Study

researchers concludes that only about 2% of patients injured by
medical malpractice ever file suit against physicians or hospitals.
In other words, of those with valid malpractice claims, 98% do not
assert them. Not only does this study suggest that many childrens'
parents will not assert claims on behalf of a child, even when they
probably should but it also is strong evidence that there is no
"malpractice crisis."

Localio, Lawthers, Brennan, Laird, Hebert,

Peterson, Newhouse, Weiler & Hiatt, Relation Between Malpractice
Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 The New England J.
of Medicine No. 4, p. 245 (July 25, 1991).
Page 8 of defendant's brief states that if no limit is
put on the time in which a guardian has to bring a claim on a
minor's behalf, a mentally disabled person would have his entire
life span to bring a claim relating to negligence at the time of
birth." Under the general tolling statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78-123 6) the guardian for a person who is both a minor and also mentally
incompetent would have a time limit.

He would have to bring the

action within the statute of limitations period, but with that
period

commencing to run when the minor reaches the age of
16

majority. That is the rule that applies to actions generally, but
the legislature has made medical malpractice actions an exception
to that rule.

The general tolling statute, which implements a

policy of not cutting off a minor's right to a remedy before he has
an opportunity to exercise his right, has not been deemed unfair to
potential defendants, largely because the vast majority of actions
are brought soon after the injury occurs. See paragraph 9 on page
10 above. Furthermore, if in a specific case it is unfair, various
equitable remedies are available.
Finally, while defendant's "chamber of horrors" argument
may have some appeal in theory, in reality tolling the running of
the statute for minors has not been a problem.

Plaintiffs are

seeking no more rights than the rights minors have had in every
other personal injury setting in this state for many, many years.
Allowing children such rights has not proved to be a significant
problem

in

other personal

injury

malpractice cases prior to 1976.

cases

or

even

in medical

Accordingly, there is nothing

suggesting that it would pose a significant problem to afford
children

the same rights to the tolling

malpractice cases now.

statute

in medical

In fact, due to the extensive and detailed

record-keeping typical of the medical profession, having a medical
claim brought after the passage of substantial time would, in all
probability,

create

less of a problem

than would

a belated

automobile accident claim, by a minor, something Utah law clearly
permits.

Medical malpractice cases tend to be very document

oriented, while other personal injury cases, such as automobile
17

accidents, tend to be very eye-witness oriented.

The memories of

witnesses to an auto accident quickly fade, while documents do not.
At the bottom of page 9 of defendants brief, he cites
five cases from other jurisdictions in support of the statement
that

"the

Constitution

treatment of minors."

has

never

required

special,

separate

Those five cases are Vance v. Vance, 108

U.S. 514, 521 (1888); Murray v. City of Milford, 380 F.2d 468, 473
(2nd Cir. 1967); Maine Medical Center v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1177
(Maine 1990); Shaw v. Zabel. 517 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Ore. 1974); and
Lametta v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 92 A.2d 731, 733 (Conn.
1952).
In the Vance, Murray and Lametta cases the minors, in
arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply to defeat
their claims, (1) did not base their arguments upon the open courts
clause nor upon any other provision of a state constitution (state
constitutions are generally interpreted to give greater protection
to the individual than does the federal constitution), (2) the
cases were not medical malpractice cases, and (3) the cases did not
involve the situation where one group of minors (those with medical
malpractice claims) were singled out and denied the protection of
a tolling statute in comparison with all other minors having other
types of claims, who did receive that protection.

Thus the equal

protection issue was not present in those cases.
In addition, in the Vance case the statute in question
imposed upon an adult an affirmative duty to act for the minor
(unlike a parent or other guardian who has no such legal duty to
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bring an action for a minor injured by medical malpractice).
The Shaw case cited by defendant was also not a medical
malpractice case.

It involved an Oregon statute of limitations

that applied to all personal injury claims of minors (not just
medical malpractice claims).

In addition, no open courts clause

was in issue in that case (as it is in the instant case), and the
court applied only a "rational basis" standard of review in
upholding the statute.
The Maine Medical Center case cited by defendant is
discussed on page 24 below.
At the top of page 10 of defendant's brief he states:
"Because minors have no special rights beyond others, removal of
the exception of the Utah tolling statute, should not be viewed as
an 'abrogation of a remedy or cause of action' within the meaning
of the Berry open courts analysis."

The response to that is as

follows:
First, under recent court decisions there has been an
increasing awareness of the unfairness and injustice of using a
statute of limitations to bar an injured person from exercising his
legal remedy before he had any practical opportunity to do so.
(See cases from other jurisdictions discussed on pages 16-21 of
plaintiffs' initial brief. Cf. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah
1981), discussed on pages 24-26 of plaintiff's initial brief.)
Under state constitutional provisions minors, speaking generally,
may well have additional rights beyond adults with regard to
statute of limitations issues.
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Second, beyond the question of whether the legislature
could constitutionally repeal the tolling statute with respect to
all claims of minors, an equal protection issue clearly arises when
it is not just minors generally that are being denied the benefit
of the tolling statute, but only the limited class consisting of
minors injured by medical malpractice.
Third, in light of the history of the tolling statute it
cannot reasonably be said that the legislature did not "abrogate a
remedy" when it denied minors having medical malpractice claims the
protection of the tolling statute.

Minors in Utah have been

protected since at least as early as 1872 from the running of
statutes of limitations which would bar their claims for injuries
during their minority.

Plaintiffs' counsel was not able to locate

Utah Laws 1872 in which that protection to minors is apparently
provided at Ch. IV, §24, p. 23, but the Compiled Laws of Utah 1876,
§1118, continues that protection in tha following language:
If a person entitled to bring an action . .
. be at the time the cause of action accrued .
. . within the age of majority . . . the time
of such disability shall not be deemed a part
of the time limited for the commencement of
the action.
Therefore, for over a hundred years (and beginning before the Utah
Constitution was adopted in 1896) children in Utah, under the
circumstances of the minor plaintiffs in the instant case, were
able to seek a legal remedy

for injuries caused by medical

malpractice, but as a result of the passage of the Utah medical
malpractice act in 1976, minor plaintiffs under the facts of the
instant case no longer have a right to pursue a legal remedy.
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It

therefore seems specious for defendant to argue that the medical
malpractice act did not take away any legal rights from minors.
On pages 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21 and 23 of defendant's
brief he cites Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P. 2d 30
(Utah 1981), but that case did not involve the claim of a minor.
It held only that the two year statute of limitations in the Utah
medical malpractice

act was not unconstitutional

under equal

protection principles as applied to claims by adults. Furthermore,
the court in that case applied only a "rational basis" test in
reviewing the constitutionality of the statute, and the later Utah
case of Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989)
(and the Utah cases of Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984),
and Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985) , on which the majority of the justices in the Condemarin case
relied), make it clear that a higher standard of review than
"rational

basis"

should

be

applied

in

addressing

the

constitutionality of the medical malpractice statute of limitations
as applied to minors.
On pages 9, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 24 of defendant's brief he
cites Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp 152 (D. Utah 1984).

In that

case a critical threshold issue for the federal district court was
whether to apply only a "rational basis" standard of review or one
of "heightened scrutiny."

The court (Judge Winder), relying in

part on Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P. 2d 30 (Utah 1981)
(discussed above), applied only the rational basis test, which, as
stated in Condemarin. affords an "almost total deference" to the
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legislative scheme. Condemarin, supra at 354. Again, in light of
the Malanr Berry and Condemarin cases, supra (all decided since
Judge Winder rendered his decision in that Haraett case), there
would seem to be little question, in addressing the issue of the
constitutionality of a statute which denies minors the benefit of
the general tolling statute, that in Utah the "rational basis" test
should be rejected
review."

in favor of an "intermediate

standard of

(The Harcrett case, was reversed on appeal. The appellate

court decision is discussed on pages 29-30 below.)
On page 17 of defendant's brief, he quotes from De Santis
v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273 (Pa. Super. 1981).

It is interesting that

defendant would cite that case because the majority opinion was
opposed to the view that defendant advocates in the instant case.
The portion quoted by defendant on page 17 of his brief is not from
the main opinion but from a concurring opinion that disagrees with
the reasoning of the majority.
minor,

brought

accident.

suit

for

In that case, the plaintiff, a

injuries

suffered

in

an

automobile

The minor's suit was dismissed by the trial court

because it was filed after the Pennsylvania two-year statute of
limitations

had

run.

On

appeal

to

the

Superior

Court

of

Pennsylvania (an intermediate appellate court), the minor argued
that the statute of limitations should be unconstitutional as
applied to minors, the Superior Court noted that the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania had 30 years earlier held that infants are bound by
statutes of limitations equally with adults; the Superior Court
stated that it was "bound" to follow that earlier Pennsylvania
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decision and therefore had no choice but to affirm the trial
court's judgment dismissing the action.

The court then stated:

The decision is not a comfortable one,
however, and it is our opinion that this
question deserves serious reconsideration by
the courts at this time. Recent advances in
the laws regarding children's rights have made
an automatic decision growing out of a
tradition that viewed children as possessions
completely unpalatable.
De Santis, supra at 1275. The court then traced the development of
minors7 rights from the early common law (which assumed that a
father "owned" his child's chose in action and therefore had the
prerogative of allowing that right to lapse) to the present day in
which

a

child's

recognized.

own

right

to

recover

for

his

injuries

is

Thus it is now hard to sustain what "appears to be

violation of a fundamental right: a chose in action as a form of
personal property that without question now belongs to the injured
child himself, and yet he is legally debarred from pursuing his
claim."

Id. at 1276. The Court concluded, "It is time to rethink

the law in this area and seriously consider change." Id. at 1279.
On page 17 of the defendant's brief, he cites Bellotti v.
Baird. 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and Parham v. J.R. . 442 U.S. 584
(1979).

The

Bellotti

case

held

a

Massachusetts

statute

unconstitutional for involving parents too much (and therefore
imposing too great a restriction) on a minor's decision whether to
obtain an abortion.

The Parham case dealt with a Georgia statute

which provided for the commitment of children to state mental
hospitals upon the request of their parents. That statute was held
to

be

constitutional

but

only
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because

it

required

the

superintendent of the hospital, as a "neutral fact finder," to
exercise his independent judgment as to the child's need for
confinement.

The parents were therefore not given unreviewable

discretion to make that decision with regard to their child. Those
cases are far afield from the facts and issues involved in the
instant case, but, interestingly, both those cases are examples of
situations where, the Supreme Court held, minors should not be
bound by the decisions of their parents.

To that extent those

cases are consistent in principle with the notion that a minor
should also not be bound by his or her parents' "decision" (made
consciously or through oversight) not to bring an action in behalf
of the minor within the limitations period, thereby (as defendant
argues) taking away from the minor the right to seek redress for an
injury.
On pages 18-20 of defendant's brief he discusses the case
of Maine Medical Center v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173 (Maine 1990).

In

that case the court indulged in the presumption that the Maine
medical malpractice statute of limitations was constitutional and
adopted only the "rational basis" test in upholding the statute.
As discussed in plaintiffs' initial brief, Condemarin v. University
Hospital, supra, indicates that when the legislature creates a
classification of persons and infringes their rights under the Utah
open

courts

clause, the

presumption

of

constitutionality

is

reversed, and the cursory "rational basis" standard of review is
not sufficient.
In support of that Maine Medical case, defendant, in
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footnote 4 on page 2 0 of his brief, cites eight cases from five
jurisdictions, but only one of those cases (Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner)
involved an open courts clause in a state constitution, and all
five of those jurisdictions employed only a "rational basis"
standard

in evaluating

the

constitutionality

malpractice statute of limitations.

of

the

medical

For example, that Rohrabaugh

case stated that "Rationality is . . . the standard by which to
judge this classification. . . . The statute is therefore presumed
constitutional, and the burden was on appellants below to negative
every

conceivable

basis

which

might

have

supported

the

classification." Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ind.
1980) .
One of those eight cases cited by defendant (Thomas v.
Niemann, 397 So.2d 90, (Ala. 1981)) did not even deal with the
constitutional issue involved in the instant case. In that Thomas
case the "single issue" before the court was whether the Alabama
Medical Liability Act enacted in 1975 was defective because it did
not comply with the requirement in the Alabama constitution that
(1) the subject of an act be clearly expressed in its title and (2)
that an act not contain more than one subject.

Id. at 91.

Another one of those eight cases cited by defendant in
footnote 4 on page 20 of his brief (Petri v. Smith, 453 A.2d 342
(Pa. Super. 1982)) is -the same intermediate appellate court that
decided the De Santis case (discussed on pages 22-23 above), and
the court in Petri referred to the "comprehensive and scholarly
opinion" in De Santis. "seriously questioning the rationale of
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barring personal injury suits by minors on a statute of limitation
basis . . . ."

Id. at 348. The court in Petri indicated that De

Santis "well expressed" the continued feelings of the court against
a statute of limitations that hold minors accountable equally with
adults, but that the court was obliged to follow the earlier
Pennsylvania precedent (which De Santis identifies as the case of
VonColln v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 80 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1951)) until
that case is overruled.

Petri v. Smithr supra at 348.

On pages 20-21 of defendant's brief, he cites three
federal cases dealing with the two-year statute of limitations in
the federal torts claims act.

Two of those cases (Robbins v.

United States and Brown v. United States) did not even discuss the
constitutional issues but dealt mainly with issues of statutory
interpretation such as whether the statute was intended to be
tolled by the plaintiff's minority, by misrepresentation

and

concealment by government doctors, by a plaintiff's not knowing
about the negligence of a government doctor, etc.

The third case

(Pittman v. United States 341 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1965)) did involve
a brief discussion of the constitutional issue with respect to the
statute of limitations in the federal torts claims act running
against minors.

The court stated:

[C]ounsel
for
appellant
argues
rather
eloquently that the claim could not accrue
until Mark [the minor] had a guardian ad litem
appointed by the court to pursue his right or
until he reached 21 years of age, because
there was nothing he could do for himself. He
says that a right without a remedy is no right
at all and therefore no claim could have
accrued.
Such argument has considerable
original merit and perhaps has been followed
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in some areas of the law outside the Federal
Tort Claims Act. But the trouble is that the
case law has piled up against Mark.

We think that the concept still adheres that
the Federal Tort Claims Act was a waiver of
government immunity. There are decisions that
say that the act should be liberally
construed. We think that may be true as to
what injuries are within the Act. But as to
time, one can see that the Congress was
alarmed about stale claims when it passed the
Act and provided that there should be only a
period of one year during which an action
could be brought. (This was later changed to
two years.)
Pittman, supra at 740-41.
The
constitution

Pittman

case

was

decided

under

the

federal

(which typically gives less protection than state

constitutions), did not involve the constitutional protection of an
open courts clause (because the federal constitution has no such
clause), was inclined to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the
statute of limitations because the Tort Claims Act was a waiver of
governmental immunity, did not employ a standard of review higher
than "rational basis" (if even that much), and did not involve the
classification of minors with a certain type of claim being treated
more restrictively than minors having other types of claims (thus
raising an equal protection issue).
II.

REPLY TO POINT II OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT REGARDING
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF REPOSE

On pages 22-23 of defendants brief he argues that in
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981)
the Utah Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of

the medical malpractice statute of repose. However, Allen did not
involve the statute of repose but dealt instead with the two-year
medical malpractice statute of limitations

(which is the more

reasonable of the two provisions because it does not begin to run
until the patient discovers the injury). Furthermore, the court in
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P. 2d 670, 683 (Utah
1985) (as quoted on page 22 of defendant's brief) points out that
in the Allen case "no issue was raised as to the constitutionality
of the statute under [the open courts clause]."

Other reasons why

the Allen case is inapplicable to the instant case are set forth on
page 21 above.
On

page

23

of

defendant's

brief,

he

represents

plaintiffs' argument in this case to be that "there is really no
difference between an equal protection and open courts analysis as
applied to the instant case

. . . ." Plaintiffs are not aware of

any place where they have made that argument. What plaintiffs have
maintained

is that when a statute infringes on an important,

substantive right protected by the open courts clause of the Utah
constitution, then the "rational basis" standard of review often
used under equal protection analysis is not adequate, and the court
should, instead, adopt a higher standard of review as outlined in
the Condemarin case.
Utah is hardly alone in striking down statutes of repose.
The Berry opinion cites a number of cases where statutes of repose
with

respect to products

liability, medical malpractice, and

architects and builders have been held to be unconstitutional by
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the supreme courts of other states.

(Berry, supra at 677-78.)

Specifically with respect to medical malpractice statutes of
repose, it has been observed that the trend of court decisions is
to find such statutes unconstitutional under state (not federal)
constitutional provisions involving guarantees of equal protection,
due process and open courts.

Note, The Unconstitutionality of

Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose:

Judicial Conscience vs.

Legislative Will, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 397-98, 409 (1989). Those state
constitutional provisions may grant greater rights to citizens than
does the federal constitution. Id. at 410. "This trend appears to
have coincided with growing judicial sentiment that the medical
malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's was illusory, and that
the legislation enacted in response to it was inappropriate" and
that such legislation has little effect on the availability of
affordable health care.

Id. at 415, 418.

III. REPLY TO POINT III OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT
REGARDING
WHETHER
THE
TWO-YEAR
STATUTE
OF
LIMITATIONS,
AS
A
MATTER
OF
STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, APPLIES TO THE MINOR PLAINTIFFS.
On pages 24-25 of defendant's brief, he relies on Hargett
v. Limbera. 598 F.Supp 152 (D. Utah 1984) as authority for his
argument that a mother bringing a medical malpractice action as
guardian ad litem for her minor child should be considered the
"plaintiff" (instead of the child) for purposes of the medical
malpractice statute of limitations.

That statute requires an

action to be brought within two years after the "plaintiff or
patient" discovers the injury. Plaintiffs response is as follows:
1. As indicated above, the Harcrett case was reversed on
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appeal.

801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986).

The Tenth Circuit held

that the "savings clause" in the medical malpractice statute of
limitations permitted the plaintiff's action in that case to be
filed within four years after the effective date of the 1979
amendment to that statute.

Because plaintiff's action was filed

within that period, plaintiff was able to proceed with the action.
The appellate court made it clear that it was expressing no opinion
on other issues in the case, which it declared to be moot,
including the issues of whether the mother's failure to bring the
action within two years of the time when she discovered the
"injury," should bar the child from filing suit and whether the
medical malpractice limitations statute violates the United States
and Utah Constitutions.
2.

If the "plaintiff" within the meaning of the medical

malpractice statute of limitations were considered to be the
guardian ad litem instead of the child, who is the real party in
interest, it would exalt form over substance because plaintiffs'
counsel could simply have appointed as guardian ad litem someone
who is a "stranger" to the child, who had no prior knowledge of the
child or of his injury or of its negligent cause.
3.

In the instant case the guardian ad litem is not the

natural parent of the children.

With respect to the claims of

Kevin and Patrick, their mother, Marian Meehan, is neither the
"plaintiff or patient," and it would be more straightforward to
hold that in a medical malpractice suit for a minor child, the
"plaintiff

or

patient"

(within
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the

meaning

of

the

medical

malpractice statute of limitations) is the child.
IV.

CONCLUSION.

Under the Condemarin and Berry cases, the "rational
basis"

standard

of review

is not sufficient

in testing the

constitutionality of either the two-year statute of limitations (as
applied to minors) or the four-year statute of repose in the
medical malpractice act because both statutes infringe rights
protected by the open courts clause. The appropriate "intermediate
standard of review" places the burden on defendant to show that:
1.

There was a medical malpractice

insurance

"crisis," and, if so, that it was caused by medical malpractice
claims (not by investment losses of insurance companies);
2.

Denying minors the protection of the tolling

statute actually helps in a substantial way to solve that crisis;
and
3.

It is reasonable to attempt to solve a medical

malpractice crisis by a measure so drastic as denying to some
minors a remedy for their injuries.
Defendant has failed to sustain his burden on any of
those issues.
Finally, depriving a very few children of the right to
seek compensation, (which in cases like this one is essential just
to cope with the financial burdens created by the injuries), as a
method for making up for poor investments of insurance companies,
increasing profits or reducing premiums, is not only repugnant to
the Constitution, but to basic notions of fairness as well.
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Furthermore, even if a true crisis existed, asking a few children
to carry a vastly disproportionate share of the overall burden of
a society-wide problem is neither an effective nor appropriate
approach. If a crisis exists, it has been caused by adults and the
burden of it should be.borne by adults.
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